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Summary
This paper analyses emerging policy discussions on climate change and agriculture in Kenya. Kenya has been 
ahead of many other countries in developing a national climate change strategy, and agriculture is one of the key 
critical sectors of interest. However, there are concerns about whether policy goals may be achieved amidst the 
actors’ many and diverging interests. This paper sets out to map how these debates are starting to take place in 
practice, and poses the following questions: what are the arguments, who is promoting them, and what are the 
implications for Kenya’s agricultural sector? A better understanding of the key actors, their interests and through 
what narratives actor-interests are mobilised is important because they will all have implications for the kinds of 
support farmers at the local level do or do not receive, and the extent to which their own interests are fore grounded 
or marginalised within the policy process. Ultimately, the policy response to climate change in the agricultural 
sector is one important factor which mediates local-level vulnerability.   
The paper examines key policy narratives and documents on climate change and agriculture, how (groups of ) 
key actors cluster in relation to the narratives, and how they are manifesting themselves in practice. In the area 
of climate change, Kenya has a comparably strong government interest and activity. Politically, the debate has 
centred on the National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) which is implemented through the National 
Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP). The NCCAP has been finalised and was launched in March 2013 (GoK, 2013). 
The emerging dominant narratives in Kenya are focused on the need to protect food security and agricultural 
resources from the negative impacts of climate change, and on the other, the possible opportunities for capitalising 
on carbon funding, often with an all-too familiar emphasis on the ‘technical fix’. A number of activities are taking place 
with donor support. In addition, a large number of NGOs and an increasing number of private actors are becoming 
key players. However, it should be acknowledged that the agricultural sector has only recently started to grapple 
with the implications of climate change. As a consequence, the key policy narratives, actors and interests which 
will shape the policy response to climate change are still coalescing, and the picture remains somewhat unclear. 
Moreover, the uncertainty over the timing and extent of international funding to assist the agricultural sector to 
build resilience to climate impacts both slows the process and raises a series of questions about demonstrating 
added value. 
The paper argues that, so far, the lack of policy coherence creates a risk of undermining long term policy goals on 
climate change and agriculture. To develop greater coherence, the paper posits that there is a need for more joined 
up policies across government beyond strategies laid out in NCCRS. The new NCCAP (GoK, 2013) provides some 
directions. Some of the proposed actions in the crops sector include promotion and bulking of drought tolerant 
traditional high value crops, conservation agriculture and integrated soil fertility management. The priority actions 
for livestock and pastoralism are fodder banks, price stabilisation mechanisms, livestock diversification, and capacity 
building. Given that there are already signs that the ways in which food security and carbon funding objectives are 
pursued seem already to favour some interest groups (i.e. intensive farming over pastoralism and dryland farming), 
there is a need to ensure there is space for a diversity of perspectives to be heard.  
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1 Introduction
Kenya was among the first non-LDC countries in 
Africa to develop government plans for responses to 
climate change across key economic sectors. Kenya’s 
recent National Climate Change Response Strategy 
(NCCRS, GoK 2010) and the national climate change 
implementation framework (2012) illustrate that climate 
change has acquired the status of a key national policy 
challenge. The National Climate Change Action Plan (GoK, 
2013) was launched in March, 2013. This was developed 
through a consultative process that engaged actors 
across government, the private sector and civil society. 
Agriculture is a key part of the NCCRS, and the NCCAP 
reflecting the reliance on agriculture for the national 
economy and for providing labour locally; 80% of Kenyans 
live in rural areas and depend directly or indirectly on 
agriculture for their livelihoods. The agricultural sector 
comprises 24% of Kenya’s GDP and 19% of the formal 
wage employment. An estimated 60% of all households 
are engaged in farming activities. 
At the same time, a large number of organisations and 
actors are conducting activities which are taking place 
across government ministries and departments, NGO and 
the private sector (see Annex 2). The resulting picture is 
arguably a confusing array of goals and interests. This 
is in a situation where agricultural policies, meanwhile, 
revolve around the main goals of transforming Kenya’s 
agricultural sector into an innovative, commercially 
oriented, competitive and modern industry for poverty 
reduction, improved food security and equity in rural and 
urban Kenya (GoK, 2010; ASDSP, 2011; ASDS, 2010). There 
is little mention of climate change in these documents 
that will guide the development of the agriculture sector 
in the coming decades. Amidst these, there are concerns 
at both international and national levels about how 
climate funding will be spent, specifically how funding 
may help achieve policy goals of adaptation, mitigation 
and poverty reduction, so-called “triple wins” embodied 
in recent terms such as “climate smart agriculture” and 
sustainable intensification (FAO, 2010). 
This paper maps how key actors consider challenges 
for climate change and agriculture in Kenya1. In particular, 
the paper looks at how climate change–agriculture 
linkages are framed, how different actors cluster around 
these narratives, and why. Finally, the paper addresses 
the implications of this for the future. This is so far an 
under-researched area, but one that will be increasingly 
important in understanding how climate funding is 
governed and whether this funding contributes to 
attainment of the goals of “low carbon climate resilient” 
agriculture.
We identify the following key findings:
1. Dominant narratives focus on technical “fixes” and 
management-oriented solutions to climate change 
in the agricultural sector.
2. There is a perception that a number of actors 
are redefining themselves as “climate change 
champions” in order to take advantage of expected 
climate funds.
3. The lack of a coherent national policy framework 
leaves significant space for powerful actors to 
influence and direct the climate change-agriculture 
agenda in the country
 
5. There is recognition of the need for increased 
adaptive capacity in agriculture, but limitations in 
strategic actions or other ‘alternative’ narratives in 
the current environment. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two charts 
the concepts and methods that underpin this study. This 
is followed in section three by a consideration of the 
current policy context on climate change and agriculture 
in Kenya. Section four offers an account of stakeholders’ 
perceptions on climate change and agriculture policy 
processes on the emerging ‘climate policy’ in Kenya in 
terms of the main narratives underpinning this, and the 
key actors and how they relate to the different narratives. 
While not an exhaustive review, the mapping gives a 
flavour of the sheer number and diverging views on 
causes, consequences and implications for action. 
Section five then discusses the implications of these 
rapid developments, with examples of projects on the 
ground. Section six reflects on the findings and offers 
some concluding remarks.
2 Concepts and methods 
2.1 Understanding policy 
processes: a conceptual 
framework
This paper’s approach to the climate change and 
agriculture landscape in Kenya is guided by a conceptual 
framework at the heart of the Future Agricultures 
Consortium’s research agenda. The framework provides 
a systematic way of understanding and explaining policy 
processes. In so doing, it starts by deconstructing the 
notion of policy itself. Policy making is often portrayed 
as a linear process which proceeds through the following 
stages set out in Figure 1.
However, we start with the premise that policy 
processes are better described as “incremental, complex 
and messy”, involving actors with often competing goals 
and interests, and which invoke evidence provided by 
research in less than straightforward or transparent 
ways (Keeley and Scoones 1999). This is in contrast 
to the conventional view, in which research results 
are communicated to policy-makers, who then make 
policy changes according to best available knowledge. 
Our approach to the policy process integrates three 
bodies of literature that help us to understand policy. 
One emphasises political economy and the interactions 
of state and civil society, and different interest groups. 
Another examines the histories and practices linked to 
shifting discourses, and how these shape and guide 
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policy problems and courses of action. The third gives 
primacy to the roles and agency (or capacity to make a 
difference) of individual actors (Keeley and Scoones 1999, 
2003). These three interconnected themes have been 
clustered in a simple framework, captured in Figure 2, 
whose component ‘lenses’ are described below:
1. Discourse and narrative (what is the ‘policy 
narrative’? How is the policy issue framed through 
science and research?)
2. Actors and networks (who is involved and how they 
are connected?)
3. Politics and interests (what are the underlying 
power dynamics and incentives for policymakers to 
promote some policies, often at the cost of others?)
It is, then, through an examination of the interplay of 
discourses and narratives, actors and institutions, politics 
and interests, that the paper presents its analysis of 
Kenyan agricultural policy in relation to climate change.
2.2  Methodology
Employing the policy processes analytical lenses; the 
methodology comprised a four stage process and was 
conducted between January 2011 and February 2012. 
In the first stage, a literature search on agriculture and 
climate change in Kenya was conducted, which served 
the following purposes: 
• It provided information on the broader 
agriculture sector policy context in Kenya, 
as well as the recent policy initiatives on 
climate change;
• It allowed us to identify the principal actors 
working on agriculture and climate change 
in Kenya; 
• It allowed us to identify the key narratives 
shaping debates and priorities for actors 
and institutions working on agriculture and 
climate change in Kenya.
In the second stage, we proceeded to map actors and 
institutions onto narratives and priorities for policy and 
practice. This was a gradual process and entailed the 
following steps:
• Use of the literature review to identify key 
actors and institutions;
• Team ‘brainstorming’ exercise in March 2011, 
which was also used to identify key actors 
and institutions, thereby filling gaps in the 
literature review. This done, we proceeded 
to map out (a) Where actors stood in relation 
to each other, (b) The narratives with which 
different actors were associated, and (c) The 
interests held by different actors.
This mapping procedure set up the	third	stage, by 
providing a sampling frame for the selection of the key 
actors with which semi-structured interviews were to 
be conducted. In total, 15 key informants were selected 
for interview (see Annex 1), each characteristic of the 
following types of institutions:
• Government ministries and departments
• Kenyan farmers’ organisations
• Kenyan private sector organisations 
• International donors
• National and international NGOs
• International research organisations
In the fourth stage, once the interviews had been 
collected, the analysis was done and written up into the 
first draft of this report. The results of the report were 
summarised into a briefing paper, which was used as the 
basis for discussion of the research findings in a policy 
roundtable that was held in Nairobi, in February 20122. 
The aim was to validate – and offer the opportunity to 
contest – our analysis with key actors in the agricultural 
Identify policy problem
Explore options for resolving problem
 
Weigh up costs & benets of dierent policy options
 





Figure 1. Conventional rationalisation of policy 
processes (adapted from Keeley and Scoones, 
2003)
Figure 2. Conceptual lenses for analysing policy 
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sector that work on climate change, and to discuss the 
implications for policy and practice of our findings. During 
the policy roundtable, there was strong agreement 
with the broad thrust of the analysis. Where there were 
disagreements, clarifications or corrections, these were 
noted and reflected in a FAC research update (Maina et al. 
2012) and re-writing of the briefing paper. The outcomes 
of the policy roundtable have also informed the analysis 
of this paper. 
3 Policy context on climate 
change and agriculture in 
Kenya
The arrival of climate change on the policy agenda in 
Kenya is fairly recent. The main Government document 
on climate change is the National Climate Change 
Response Strategy (NCCRS) from 2010 (GoK 2010). A 
National Climate Change Action Plan is now finalised, 
in order to operationalise the NCCRS. A draft climate 
change policy is also in circulation. The NCCRS is not a 
policy document but a government strategy. However, 
as there is no policy document on climate change and 
agriculture, the NCCRS has received much attention 
and can be seen as the de facto policy document of the 
Kenyan government, until March 2013 when the NCCAP 
was launched. The NCCRS lays out the strategies and 
modes of coordination across the range of sectors in 
Kenya (Figure 3). 
Until March 2013, the two key Government bodies 
working directly on climate change issues were the 
Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (MEMR), 
which was the lead technical agency, and the Office of the 
Prime Minister (OPM), which has a coordinating function; 
10 sector ministries constituted the agricultural sector:
• Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 
• Ministry of Livestock Development (MoLD) 
• Ministry of Fisheries Development (MoFD) 
• Ministry of Cooperative Development and 
Marketing (MoCD&M) 
• Ministry of Lands (MoL) 
• Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MoW&I) 
• Ministry of Regional Development Authorities 
(MoRDA) 
• Ministry of Environment and Mineral 
Resources (MoE&MR) 
• Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MoF&W) 
• Ministry of Development of Northern Kenya 
and Other Arid Lands (MoNK&AL) 
The Ministry of State for Planning, National 
Development and Vision 2030 (MoSPND and  Vision 2030) 
was also an important ministry because the agricultural 
sector is an important sector in achieving the goals of 
the economic pillar of Vision 2030. 
The NCCRS and more recently the NCCAP grew out 
of a process involving a wide range of stakeholders, 
including parliamentarians, clusters of stakeholders on 
government, private sector, civil society, and development 
agencies in national and regional workshops (GoK 2010). 
Kenyan civil society (local NGOs and international NGOs 
based in Kenya) has had an active role in consultations 
for the NCCRS, for the most part through the Kenya 
Climate Change Working Group (KCCWG). KCCWG has 
been leading the process of preparing a draft Climate 
Change Bill4.  
The NCCRS has thus been intended as a coherent 
response strategy from the Kenyan government, ready 
to be rolled out across sectors. However, there is so far 
no clear linkage between NCCRS and the agricultural 
sector ministries. The agricultural policy in Kenya does 
not mention climate change explicitly. Agricultural sector 
goals revolve around increasing productivity and income 
growth, especially for smallholders; enhanced food 
security and equity, emphasis on irrigation to introduce 
stability in agricultural output, commercialisation and 
intensification of production especially among small 
scale farmers; appropriate and participatory policy 
formulation and environmental sustainability. Policies 
in the Agricultural Sector Ministries are shown in Annex 3. 
The government has used a “systems approach” 5 to the 
agriculture sector. This means that the agriculture sector 
ministries are viewed as components whose synergistic 
functions should lead to attainment of the objectives 
set out in the agricultural sector. In the nexus of climate 
change and agriculture, this strategy postulates that 
when each of the sector ministries aligns its operations 
to the tenets of the NCCRS and now the NCCAP, then 
the agricultural sector will respond effectively to the 
Figure 3: Elements of the Kenya National Climate 
Change Action Plan3.  
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challenges of climate change and climate variability. This 
is debatable.
In principle, agricultural sector ministries are meant 
to align their climate change activities and plans to the 
NCCRS as stipulated in the NCCAP and in consequence 
to the international policy debates including that by 
the UNFCCC. While this may take care of the upstream 
interests at national, regional and international levels, the 
downstream may be neglected. Implementation of the 
NCCRS through the NCCAP strategies is in its formative 
stages and remains at the level of mainstreaming into 
government plans and development of implementation 
strategies.
In the Kenyan agricultural policy, key areas of concern 
include: 
• Increasing agricultural productivity and 
incomes, especially for small-holder farmers. 
• Emphasis on irrigation to reduce over-
reliance on rain-fed agriculture in the face 
of limited high potential agricultural land. 
• Encourag ing  d ive r s i f i ca t ion  in to 
non-traditional agricultural commodities 
and value addition to reduce vulnerability. 
• Enhancing the food security and a reduction 
in the number of those suffering from hunger 
and hence the achievement of Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). 
• Encouraging private-sector-led development 
of the sector. 
• Ensuring environmental sustainability. 
Both the NCCRS and the NCCAP view agriculture, as 
the most weather - dependent sector of the Kenyan 
economy, as the one which will ‘bear the brunt’ of climate 
change and variability. Agriculture is centre-stage as a 
livelihood activity in Kenya. Specifically, climate change 
is seen as a stressor threatening food security through 
increases in droughts and floods, and increased dry 
spells during the rainy season. There is a particular 
focus on drought, given recent history of recurring 
droughts in Kenya. A current government initiative 
that provides a supportive framework for implementing 
climate change responses to drought is the National 
Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern 
Kenya and other Arid Lands. The policy established the 
National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), the 
National Disaster Contingency Fund and the Council 
for Pastoralists education. The strategy and the action 
plan also point to the potential for Kenya to tap into 
global carbon markets. The NCCRS and the NCCAP thus 
frame the challenge of climate change for agriculture 
in ways which are consistent with global narratives on 
the relationship between agriculture and climate change 
(FAO 2009, Barrios et al., 2008, Brown and Funk 2008). 
Thus arguably there is a clear overlap between policies 
and strategies for climate change and agriculture, at 
least in the solutions suggested. However, there are also 
contested areas, which we will now turn to.
4 Confronting climate change 
in Kenyan agriculture: 
Narratives and actors
A wide range of agricultural-based actors have a stake 
and interest in climate variability and climate change 
in Kenya. Figure 4 is one depiction of the landscape 
of actors, showing a snapshot of some of the key 
organisations involved in debates surrounding climate 
change in Kenya. While by no means exhaustive, the 
figure illustrates the seemingly “chaotic” picture and the 
multiplicity of organised efforts geared towards climate 
change and climate variability in the country. 
As noted above, there is wide agreement over the core 
message (as also framed in the NCCRS and the NCCAP) 
around climate change and agriculture in Kenya, namely 
that climate change is an externally imposed problem, 
which the country will suffer from. Agriculture is given 
particular attention as a very climate sensitive sector. 
At the same time, there are also hopes of funding for 
projects to help store carbon.  
Beyond this broad agreement, however, the debate 
remains at a relatively incipient stage. What we can 
see – and what the following sections discuss – is the 
emergence of two major narratives straddling the debate 
in Kenya:
1. Climate change as a threat to food security, and
2. Climate change as an opportunity to address 
energy and forest degradation problems
Beyond discursive positioning, though, response to 
the challenge of climate change is in its infancy. Moreover, 
there is not yet a huge amount of funding available 
yet for climate-specific initiatives, as discussed below, 
which constrains the size of the response that is currently 
possible, and also distorts the process through which 
priorities are decided. The most important implication of 
this situation is that there is more space for manoeuvre 
amongst existing dominant interests, some of whom 
are starting to position themselves as ‘climate change 
champions’, and to rebrand existing activities as responses 
to climate change. Using the lens of understanding 
policy processes, this section charts what activities are 
starting to be vaunted as climate solutions, who are likely 
to benefit and which other actors may be excluded or 
harmed as a consequence.  
4.1 Adaptation, resilience and 
food security 
At the heart of this narrative is the concern over food 
security and how it may be threatened by climate change. 
The Kenyan National Climate Change Response Strategy 
(NCCRS) brings food security centre stage: 
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“The emphasis is to prioritise the most vulnerable 
sectors of the economy namely agriculture and 
food security, water, forestry, rangelands, health, 
social and physical infrastructure” (GoK 2010:45).
This has been re-emphasised in the NCCAP with 
the outline of proposed adaptation actions from the 
adaptation technical analysis report (ATAR) for the 
agricultural sector (GoK, 2013:59)
Kenya has suffered badly over recent years, particularly 
from droughts, and there is a strong sense that more 
should be done to make the Kenyan society better 
prepared for future droughts. The NCCRS recognises 
that Kenyans are vulnerable to existing climate change 
variability because of high dependency on key natural 
resources and a relatively low adaptive capacity to cope 
with climate-related impacts. 
In the agricultural sector, stakeholders emphasise 
adaptation in order to pursue short term, medium term 
and even long term projects. A respondent from the 
National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) 
argued that concerns over food security are driving 
climate change adaptation actions, albeit still in an 
emergency response mode:
“Sometimes natural calamities like prolonged 
droughts affecting food security, have forced the 
government to respond in an emergency manner 
and allocate funds for climate change adaptation, 
though this is for short term adaptation measures 
mostly.”
To deal with immediate climate change impacts, 
interviewees perceived the need to focus on increasing 
vegetation cover, expand carbon sinks and bridge the 
gap between the dry spells. These aspects need to occur 
concurrently since climate change is an integrated and 
complex system whose dynamics are inadequately 
understood in Kenya. Adaptation mechanisms to improve 
the food security situation would ensure that agriculture 
contributes adequately to countering climate change 
impacts. This requires continuous management of natural 
resources, close monitoring of agricultural systems and 
effective disaster preparedness and management.
This view is reflected in the strategies of the agricultural 
sector ministries6 and many non-governmental 
organisations, which are focusing on building resilience 
of communities through promotion of agricultural 
practices such as drought resistant crop varieties, as well 
as improved management livestock and water resources. 
International NGOs such as CARE, and international 
research bodies such as the World Agroforestry and 
ILRI are also involved with a large number of adaptation 
actions. These include, for example, the Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES) pilot project in Lake 
Naivasha basin7 and the Index Based Livestock Insurance 
project in Marsabit8,  respectively.
As will be elaborated more below, adaptation strategies 
being promoted here include: conservation agriculture; 
promotion of drought tolerant crops; water harvesting 
using small and medium size dams; management of 
livestock diseases; crop and forage production; as well 
	  
Figure 4. Mapping of climate change policy actors in Kenya 
Working Paper 070 www.future-agricultures.org9
as institutionalisation of early warning systems and early 
response mechanisms. 
These efforts are supported by research activities of 
bodies such as the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
(KARI) who provide the technical information regarding 
crop and livestock varieties that are resistant or tolerant 
to pests and diseases, drought, and have improved 
nutritional value as well as vaccines against priority 
livestock diseases. The non-governmental institutions are 
also heavily involved in this area. At the national level the 
Kenya Climate Change Working Group brings together 
many civil society organisations that support reduced 
climate change vulnerability of poor communities 
in Kenya through awareness and strengthening the 
capacity of Kenyan local communities and civil society 
to implement community based adaptation projects. 
The following sections explore three policy areas that 
typify some of challenges associated with agriculture 
and climate change, particularly for the groups most 




Growing of crops well adapted to local conditions with 
disease and pest resistance as well as drought tolerance 
emerged in the interviews as a key element in responding 
to the threat to food security from climate change. In 
the words of a senior government official, research into 
improved crops is “how you develop your resistance to 
drought”. Specifically, greater pest and disease incidence 
among crops, as a result of changes in temperature, were 
identified as key challenges to address. For this reason, 
the need for pest resistant crops has been vaunted as a 
viable option in dealing with the effects of climate change 
and climate variability. 
The intuitive appeal of addressing drought and 
pests with crops that are less susceptible to these 
phenomena is very clear, and it is understandable that 
actors in the Kenyan government, as well as others in 
the private sector should find the greater production 
of the great Kenyan staple, maize, a logical proposition. 
However, advocating drought resistant maize is not 
as straightforward, and perhaps not such an effective 
adaptation strategy as it may sound; at least not on its 
own. Future Agricultures Consortium-related research 
on maize and environmental change in Kenya (Brooks 
et al 2009) has highlighted the dangers of ‘pipeline’ 
technology supply models. These concentrate on private 
sector provision of drought-tolerant maize, which fit well 
with the classic ‘modernisation’ narrative that has proved 
as enduring as it has problematic in the agricultural sector 
in Africa. 
Brooks et al (2009) argue that concentrating on 
this kind of response to climate-related threats to 
food security, the forms of knowledge and the actor-
networks that accompany it can provoke a dilemma. This 
is because, in seeking to respond through the ‘formal’ 
maize distribution system, the informal systems and 
seeds farmers use are prone to be overlooked. The 
interests of private seed distributors working through a 
formal seed distribution system are not necessarily the 
same as those of local farmers. Therefore, if the narrative 
surrounding a new Green Revolution based on this type 
of drought resistant maize holds sway, we should not 
necessarily expect attainment of food security to be 
achieved, especially in areas where maize does not do 
well, or is unlikely to do well due to climate change and 
climate variability.
Another issue that came out strongly from the research 
conducted by Brooks et al (2009) was that for a great 
many farmers, one way to deal with increased droughts 
is to plant other drought tolerant crops such as cassava, 
millet, cowpeas or green grams.  However, most of these 
crops which traditionally were widely consumed are 
sometimes considered “the poor man’s crop”, which can 
put some off cultivating them. There is a danger to this 
framing that one NGO respondent expresses thus: 
“The attitude that food is equivalent to maize limits 
adoption of relevant technologies in support of 
the variable climate. Communities fail to adopt 
alternative technologies that are more suited to 
climate adaptation such as sorghum due to a 
fixation with maize.”
However, on this front, there is increasing engagement 
on the government side, with some of the other 
strategies farmers are finding useful, such as a greater 
government commitment to work on ‘orphan crops’, or 
to change the framing to the friendlier ‘sibling crops’. 
Yet an alternative narrative around strengthening 
resilience in the face of drought cannot solely be based 
on cultivating ‘orphan/’sibling’ crops. Rather than simply 
enlisting private sector interests to supply drought 
tolerant maize through a formal ‘pipeline’ distribution 
system, the types of engagement with farmers also 
needs to be considered, so that their voices are heard, 
not marginalised and so that solutions are tailored to 
the various ways in which they use maize. This speaks, 
then to an agenda that goes well beyond appropriate 
technologies, but which instead encompasses broader 
questions of participatory governance of the design of 
adaptation measures in Kenya.
4.1.2	 Conservation	agriculture	
(CA)
Conservation farming is seen as another activity that 
will enhance the attainment of the ideals enshrined 
in the climate change strategy. The benefits of this 
approach of agricultural production are however not 
completely worked out. Its acceptance and benefits in 
practice is also questionable. Conservation agriculture 
(CA) was motivated by the efficacy of combating erosion 
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and reversing crop yield decline in the United States of 
America and Brazil in the 1970s. Research and extension 
programs in Africa, supported by major international 
initiatives (e.g. FAO, GTZ, GFAR, ECAF, CIMMYT, AFD) 
have increasingly promoted the principles of CA. There 
is no clear funding pipeline in the Kenyan context to 
help promote conservation agriculture and within 
the NCCAP, the strategy is not widely articulated but 
is rather mentioned as work under research (pg. 125). 
Furthermore, weeding/tilling is often an occupational 
role and a livelihood strategy for women, the main 
agricultural practitioners, in most African countries. 
This may limit the wide adoption of the approach that 
promotes non-tillage in Kenya, and hence investments in 
upscaling the technology may not yield the advantages 
the approach may have for climate change adaptation 
and are likely to go to waste.
4.1.3	 Dairy	farming	and	rearing	
small	ruminants
Kenya is the regional hub for dairy technology. The 
East Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (EAAPP) is 
designed to invest in regional approaches to agricultural 
research through supporting the strengthening and 
scaling up of agricultural research in Eastern Africa 
focusing on dairy, wheat, cassava and rice. Kenya was 
identified as the host for the dairy centre of excellence 
due to its comparative advantage in the dairy sector in 
terms of superior genetics, feeding technologies, animal 
health technologies and organisation of farmers’ producer 
units. The lead implementing agency for the EAAPP is the 
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI). The dairy 
technology centre of excellence is housed at the KARI 
station in Naivasha. The dairy industry in Kenya is a major 
income earner for a large proportion of the population 
in highly productive areas. It is also an industry in which 
many technocrats and top level decision-makers in the 
country have invested in. The industry enjoys social, 
economic and political patronage. It is unlikely for the 
country to curtail its development. 
Unfortunately, however, the focus on the dairy 
industry might be at the expense of the small ruminants 
that are widely utilised and that support many poorer 
livelihoods over the expansive arid and semi-arid lands 
(ASALs). This raises a crucial question: are current efforts 
for development of dairy production, versus those given 
to small ruminant development, commensurate with the 
need to focus on the people most vulnerable to climate 
change impacts? Some government actors were of the 
view that, with increased consumption of meat, farmers 
need not lose out on the opportunity to make money, 
and therefore emphasis should be on promotion of small 
ruminants and to a lesser extent the larger beef animals. 
This view was contradicted by other stakeholders 
who were of the view that emphasising small ruminants, 
especially the grazers, could lead to greater environmental 
damage through large scale degradation of grazing lands. 
There is little scientific evidence to support or discredit 
these arguments and there remains considerable scope 
for conjecture. Nevertheless, the above highlights the 
need for development policy to consider climate change 
so that the livelihoods of the poor that are expected to 
be most at risk from climate change are not further 
marginalised.
4.2 Mitigation, energy and REDD+
The key argument here is that carbon funding holds 
great promise for the agricultural sector in that it can give 
major potential contributions to energy security as well as 
lower degradation. This is supported by the government 
through its Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(NAMAs), but also other key institutions.
NAMAs form part of the Kenyan government’s 
mitigation strategies, aimed at moving the economy 
into a low-carbon path as set out under the Cancun 
Agreements. Energy is key to agricultural development, 
and particularly relevant for newly set up mechanised 
irrigation schemes, in drying of vegetables and grain and 
also for value addition. Proper drying of grains also yields 
other positive externalities like combating the aflatoxin 
problem. Since current hydro-power energy output is not 
sufficient for Kenya’s energy supply, there is a growing 
dependency on diesel power generators. To increase the 
national electricity grid and to drive the economy on a 
low-carbon trajectory, there is also focus on other forms 
of power such as geothermal power, solar or wind power. 
The narrative appeal of these “green” power sources is 
that they hold out the promise of enabling the country 
to adapt to climate change and mitigate emissions. 
However, access to electricity does not necessarily 
translate into connectivity of households to the national 
grid. Many households, especially in rural areas, have 
electricity lines passing over their houses, but due to low 
resource endowment, they lack the capacity to connect. 
Thus, it is not automatic that a majority of rural households 
will benefit from increased energy availability, green or 
otherwise, at least in the short term. In contrast, the large 
commercial farming operations that do have an energy 
supply, and who use it in order to increase their capacity 
to service high-value markets (such as cut flowers in 
Europe) may contribute to widening the gap between 
themselves and smallholder farmers. 
Activities in this area were previously carried out by 
government ministries, particularly the Office of the 
Prime Minister; Ministry of Environment and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR); Ministry of Energy; Ministry of 
Planning, National Development and Vision 2030, with 
funding from international donor agencies such as the 
AFD. Private sector actors such as CAMCO, KAM and 
KEPSA as well as the policy research bodies such as 
KIPPRA provide additional research services. 
Development of geothermal power and increasing the 
country’s tree cover and other forest resources, including 
agroforestry practices and improved natural resources 
management systems, are some of the mechanisms 
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already embraced. The NCCAP lists solar home systems; 
energy efficient bulbs; geo-thermal power generation; 
wind power generation and improved cooking stoves 
as mechanisms within actions for energy mitigation and 
adaptation.
Yet even if energy access was improved, prior to 
being able to benefit from renewable energy sources, 
farmers would require access to mechanised farming 
technologies, which raises long-standing issues both 
around the affordability and the appropriateness of 
such technologies to current farming practice. This 
then complicates the argument that a focus on energy 
generation is critical to agricultural production in the 
face of climate change impacts. 
Working closely with the Ministry of Planning, other 
government departments and the private sector, the 
Office of the Prime Minister was also involved in efforts 
geared towards carbon financing and trading under 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Given the 
apical positioning of the Office of the Prime Minister 
in Kenya’s former governance structure, the energy 
debate continues to receive considerable attention. This 
situation gives credence to the postulation in the policy 
process framework by Keeley and Scoones (2003) that 
some voices are heard over others when making policy 
decisions, and in terms of how resources to implement the 
decisions are allocated. Yet it remains unclear whether the 
Kenyan government renewable energy strategy leaves 
space for, and is responsive to the needs and priorities 
of, smallholder farmers. In fairness, Kenya appears to be 
making efforts to ensure greater inclusivity. For instance, 
it established a geo-thermal energy initiative in July 2012, 
which is part of the Nairobi-Paris Initiative for Electricity, 
and which the Kenyan government is hoping can be 
funded. The justification for the initiative, according to 
one senior government official is that it can attempt 
to bridge the “difference between access to electricity 
and connectivity”, which arises when people who can 
access electricity do not connect, principally for reasons 
of poverty. 
The country is also undergoing the process of 
identifying priority activities for implementation of the 
‘Reducing Emissions through avoided deforestation and 
degradation’ scheme (REDD+), one of the few parts of the 
UN international climate negotiations process to have 
gained a significant amount of traction. The focus on 
REDD resonates with an influential climate change and 
agriculture narrative at the global level, which attributes 
widespread environmental degradation to African 
agricultural practices (i.e. World Bank 2005). Though this 
proposition has been much contested and problematised 
(e.g. Leach and Mearns 1996, Fairhead and Leach 1998, 
Keeley and Scoones 2003, Tiffen et al 1994), current 
framings of the relationship between climate change and 
agriculture leave considerable space for this narrative of 
environmental crisis (Silva Villaneuva and Hiraldo, 2013). 
Whilst it is hard to deny a link between agricultural 
activity and degradation in the round, the risk is that 
this framing can misattribute blame and thereby 
de-legitimise small-scale farming practices which may 
actually contribute to objectives of sustainability, and 
which may further constitute a source of considerable 
adaptive capacity in the face of climate variability. An 
NGO respondent voiced this concern as follows: 
“The REDD process poses the danger of restricting 
small scale farmers because these farmers are 
considered the main agents of degradation. This 
is notwithstanding the activities undertaken by 
big concessions in mining and logging for example 
Tiomin in the Coast Province.” 
4.2.1	 Production	of	bio-fuels	
instead	of	food	production
The debate over the relationship, and potential 
tradeoffs, between food and biofuels production is 
gathering momentum in Kenya. Biofuels can offer 
carbon emissions reductions at both national and 
international levels, and for this reason, can be framed 
as one contribution that the agricultural sector can make 
to dealing with climate change. A source at the Kenya 
Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), argued, “I am quite a 
supporter of the biomass fuel because that will reduce 
coal in this country”. Whilst concerns have been raised 
that growing biofuels reduces space for food production 
(e.g. Nunow 2011), the KEPSA source maintained that 
“Kenya has got enough land to grow food and fuel”, as 
current crop production does not cover all the cultivable 
land available. KEPSA also advocated the use of biomass 
for power generation; for example, the potential of a 
eucalyptus-fuelled power plant in an area such as 
Bungoma can be exploited by, encouraging eucalyptus 
production by paying local producers, and using the 
proceeds from the energy sold to cover the costs of 
power generation. This was viewed as more efficient and 
profitable than growing maize, as more of the biomass 
produced would be sold in the case of eucalyptus than it 
would in the case of maize (where only a small proportion 
of the biomass of the whole plant is marketable and only 
a small proportion of the plant is eaten). 
While there may technically be sufficient land to 
accommodate the growing of biofuels and food, there are 
two concerns that opponents of biofuels production have 
put forward. First, the prices of the oil seeds have been 
on a downward trend and the buyers of the seed are few, 
causing concern about its sustainability. Certainly, the 
history of agriculture in Africa is littered with examples 
of farmers being advised to switch to mono-crops on the 
basis of greater profitability, and then find themselves 
exposed to the volatility of international commodity 
markets over which they have no influence. These 
examples should act as a caution for Kenyan farmers 
interested in the biofuels market. 
So far, though, it is not smallholder farmers that 
have been doing the running on biofuels in Kenya, but 
commercial actors geared up for larger-scale, intensive 
production. It is the predominance of this type of actor 
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which leads to the second concern. Establishing biofuels 
production in Kenya has become embroiled in conflicts 
over land use, in which some of the people already 
most vulnerable to climate change could lose access to 
farming land. For example, in the Tana River Delta, one 
commentator warns that up to 25,000 people living in 
30 villages could face eviction from their ancestral land 
due to land deals struck to produce biofuels and other 
intensive land uses (Nunow 2011a). Within this context, 
pastoralists are particularly at risk of losing access to land 
and other resources required for their livestock (ibid). 
Certainly, the Kenyan government has not been slow in 
contemplating the selling of land for intensive agriculture 
in the Tana River Delta to commercial actors, some of 
whom are Kenyan, some of whom are international. 
According to the same commentator (Nunow 2011b), 
for biofuels alone, land deals of 130,000ha have either 
been agreed or are currently in negotiation, out of a total 
of 345,000ha under consideration in the area.   
On the face of it, this looks like a case in which corporate 
and government interests stand to gain at the expense of 
those of local farmers, in ways which threaten to increase, 
rather than to reduce, vulnerability to climate impacts. 
However, without entirely ruling out this possibility, other 
commentators suggest that the picture is not quite so 
straightforward. Smalley and Corbera (2012) argue that in 
the case of both biofuels-related land acquisitions in the 
Tana Delta, local level opposition and manoeuvring led 
to concessions, changes and stalling of implementation. 
The complicated land tenure situation comes into play, in 
which de facto customary tenure provides a strong basis 
for resisting de facto ownership claims. Moreover, for the 
scheme that has gone ahead there is some local support 
as well as there is opposition. Nevertheless, Smalley and 
Corbera (2012) conclude that this capacity for resistance 
is patchy, and that greater decision-making power lies 
with local and national elites than with local farmers. 
Without denying the capacity for local agency, therefore, 
there do appear to be strong grounds for concerns about 
the implications of biofuels and other land acquisitions 
for the vulnerability of local farmers to climate impacts.
4.2.2	 ‘Climate-Smart	Agriculture’
Narratives around climate-smart agriculture (CSA) 
has been storming the international agenda, figuring 
heavily as a topic for international conferences and 
taking centre-stage at recent agriculture side events 
at the UN climate summits in Cancún and Durban. The 
Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World Bank, 
amongst others, have been investing heavily in the 
term. Indeed, the standard, accepted definition of CSA 
is that provided by the FAO: “agriculture that sustainably 
increases productivity, resilience (adaptation), reduces or 
removes green house gas emissions (mitigation) while 
enhancing the achievement of national food security 
and the Millennium Development Goals” (2010:ii). This 
is often dubbed the ‘triple win’ scenario. 
Kenya is very much an emerging ‘player’ in the climate-
smart agriculture narrative that has quickly emerged, 
as it plays host to the Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project 
(KACP), perhaps the African flagship CSA project (though 
Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda also have projects 
classifiable under the CSA banner). A joint initiative 
between the World Bank and the Kenyan government, 
and implemented by the Swedish Cooperative Center - Vi 
Agroforestry Program (SCC-ViA), the Kenya Agricultural 
Carbon Project is an attempt to kick-start an offset 
market for soil carbon sequestration (Sharma and 
Suppan 2012; Atela 2012). Financed through the World 
Bank’s BioCarbon Fund, it is a response to the fact that 
currently, carbon credits sequestered by agriculture are 
not accepted either by the European Trading scheme 
or by the UNFCCC Clean Development Mechanism. 
The World Bank argues that this exclusion impedes 
smallholder farmers in Africa from “accessing emerging 
carbon markets and from benefiting from significant 
payments for emission reductions” (2010:3). The KACP 
is seen as a step towards showing the benefits of climate 
smart agriculture, so that eventually, it will be possible to 
include carbon sequestration credits from agriculture in 
international carbon markets (Lager and Nyberg 2012). 
But it is also about getting farmers to adopt what are 
billed as ‘sustainable agricultural land management’ 
practices which are intended to aid adaptation in the face 
of climate impacts and improve food security outcomes. 
The KACP therefore is clearly framed in terms of the 
‘triple win’. However, not all Kenyan policy actors are 
convinced who the winners from the KACP are supposed 
to be. One informant worried that the KACP was another 
instance of an externally imposed agenda: 
“International policy processes impinge what we 
do on the ground and it’s not friendly sometimes. 
The Ministry of Agriculture is focusing on carbon 
agriculture, which in reality is futile in Africa, 
to be practical. It’s a political tool to enhance 
below ground carbon sequestration, the hand 
of international politics. Even the strategic plan 
for MoA has a lot of donor influence because of 
funding. 
This informant is not the only one to voice concerns 
about the Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project. Sharma 
and Suppan (2011) have criticised the project on the 
following grounds: 
• The monetary benefits that carbon 
sequestration could bring to farmers even 
if it does become possible to sell the credits 
is negligible, working out at little over US$1 
per year over the 9 year lifespan of the project 
(assuming a carbon price of US$4 per ton of 
CO2. There is nothing in this project which 
is likely to be able to change the rather 
moribund state of the carbon markets which 
are central to its raison d’être.  
• The transaction costs behind the project are 
considerable, and explain in part why the 
financial benefits are so low.
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• Farmers are being asked to adopt new 
farming methods which they have taken 
little or no part in designing.
• The computer model-based method for 
reporting and verifying emissions reductions 
is so uncertain that the emissions reductions 
total it projects will be discounted by 60%. 
Such uncertainty brings into question 
whether this method will be accepted 
according to the criteria of The Verified 
Carbon Standard, a benchmark against which 
the credibility of methods for reporting and 
verifying emissions reductions. To date, 
despite 5 rounds of modifications to the 
method, it has yet to be accepted.  
• As with other forms of carbon trading, carbon 
agriculture arguably shifts the burden of 
emissions reduction onto the poor. 
4.3	 Finance	for	climate	change	
and	agriculture	in	Kenya	
A considerable number of informants interviewed in 
the research highlighted climate finance as a difficult 
area in the Kenyan context. One of the key perceptions 
is that the climate agenda is often determined not by 
local priorities but by donor imperatives. A respondent 
from the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resource 
maintains: 
“The local institutions’ course of action is being 
driven by where the funds are coming from. This 
is the reason why donors have a great influence on 
the CC activities and processes within the country.”
In the words of the climate change desk officer at the 
Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers 
(KENFAP):
“When agencies at the international level are 
giving funds to LDCs it’s not that they want us to 
adapt to climate change but (they give us funds) 
so that they can do what they want to do.”
In other words, the concern is that there is not 
sufficient space for the agenda to be defined locally: the 
suggestion is that it is defined by the donors through 
the conditionalities attached to the funding. Even a 
programme officer in the Kenya office of AFD, the French 
government’s international cooperation agency, admits: 
“International politics also play a great role in 
determining what goes on in Kenya or what 
investments go into CC issues. As an example, 
what AFD gets as funds for loans is decided by 
the French government. Because of this you cannot 
rule out political influence and political priorities 
on the funding process and activities.”
A lot of climate change funding from the North is 
targeted at the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). This 
framing is unhelpful for Kenya, as it is not classified 
as an LDC, and thereby denied access to this kind of 
funding. As a result, Kenya has adopted the position 
in the climate negotiations that climate finance should 
go to the countries which are most affected by and 
most vulnerable to climate impacts. However, a senior 
government official pointed out that there is resistance 
from other African countries to this broader framing: 
“We always have a war between Kenya and 
Tanzania when they use the word LDCs because we 
want them [i.e. Annex I countries] to generally say 
most affected developing countries [as recipients 
of climate finance]. Tanzania thinks that will make 
it too open and we will make the money available 
to them less.
Furthermore, even in the case of Annex I countries 
who do publicly favour targeting finances on the most 
vulnerable countries more broadly, the same informant 
was not convinced that Kenya will automatically stand 
to benefit. This is, according to the same source, partly 
because even within this broader framing, Annex I 
nations will continue to: 
 “have their favourite countries. So we won’t be 
among their favourite countries yet we are among 
those vulnerable to Climate Change and we have 
produced evidence, through our climate change 
strategy that it is impacting us”.  
But it is also because the very inclusivity of a framing 
focused on the most vulnerable makes space for 
countries such as China or Mexico to make their case 
for consideration as recipients of climate funding. Given 
strong US (and other Northern) opposition to providing 
finance to countries perceived to have sufficient resources 
of their own, it is harder to gain international agreement 
on what level of finances should be provided, and to 
whom. Therefore, Kenya, it could be argued is caught 
between a rock and a hard place: it is not an LDC, and 
the larger category into which it would fit is subject to 
global geo-political wrangling over which Kenya itself 
can hope to have little influence.   
This is not to say that Kenya does not receive any climate 
funding. Kenya is a beneficiary of the UNFCCC special 
loans for CDM projects whose proposals for funding are 
vetted by NEMA. Direct negotiations with donor agencies 
and foreign government have also yielded resources 
that include the Adaptation fund; the Green fund as 
well as the GEF funds on biodiversity, climate change 
and agriculture. Yet again, NEMA is the implementing 
entity for this fund and it also screens proposals for GEF 
funding. Other funding agencies include the UNDP, FAO, 
Rockefeller Foundation, DANIDA, the European Union, 
UNDP, FAO, IDRC, UNEP, World Bank and other donors. 
Some funds are used for capacity development at post-
graduate level. UNEP, World Bank, UNDP, the Danish 
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Government and other donors fund various civil society 
groups in Kenya directly. 
However, even qualifying for this kind of finance does 
not guarantee that the country will receive additional 
funds. As one informant explains:
 “…The key is the word additional to the traditional 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), the 
commitment that all these countries have - I mean 
it’s not a favour they have been doing when you 
see them supporting the developing world, it’s a 
commitment they have. It’s a percentage of their 
GDP -0.7%. And they have never reached it. So 
when you say additional that’s what negotiators 
in the climate change discussion are trying to push 
for. So they want money exceeding 0.7% over 
the ODA and tagged as climate change. So these 
people do not divert traditional ODA and say this 
is climate change money.”
Whilst the Green Climate Fund has now become 
established in the international climate negotiations 
under the UNFCCC, there are still not sufficient 
requirements on donors to demonstrate whether 
the funds they allocate to demonstrate that they are 
complying with their obligations are new or additional. 
The implications of this lack of monitoring are evident 
in Kenya. According to a number of interviewees, the 
funding that is provided by many donors through these 
various channels is not actually additional, but is instead 
existing ODA which has been relabelled. The risk, then, is 
that some activities that are implemented in the name 
of climate change are not necessarily designed from 
scratch to address these objectives (even if they can 
make contributions to enhancing adaptive capacity or 
to mitigation objectives). Moreover, the lack of additional 
funding ensures that much of what is done under the 
climate rubric would have been done anyway, leaving 
to one side the more difficult question of whether such 
efforts will be sufficient to deal with the scale of the 
challenge. Even calls for additional funding of US$100 
billion to assist developing countries in dealing with 
climate change are frequently challenged as being 
insufficient to respond to the magnitude of the climate 
problem. The fact that very little of this funding appears to 
be materialising suggests a limited room for manoeuvre 
to work on climate change, and goes some way to 
explaining why efforts to tackle climate change in the 
agricultural sector remain at an incipient stage.
Accessibility to funds and funds allocation within 
government ministries is guided by the planning 
processes in the various ministries. However, some 
informants were of the view that when it comes to 
allocation of the funds to the various sectors, politics and 
interests play a critical role. Hence though the national 
level plans for funds allocation are clear, implementation 
of budgets may differ. The following remark from a key 
informant alludes to this:
“Generally I think that funds allocation is guided 
by the planning process at the various ministries. 
The work plans submitted are then moderated at 
the treasury before the funds are allocated; this 
is at the national level. But on the other hand, 
when it comes to allocation of the funds at the 
various sector levels (e.g. agriculture, energy, and 
water, etc), politics and selfishness plays a critical 
role. Hence, though at the national level plans 
everything may look rosy, during implementation 
the picture is different.” 
At other times allocation of funds is done on a reactive 
basis. For example, when natural calamities like prolonged 
droughts affect food security, government is forced 
to respond in an emergency manner and re-allocate 
funds to agriculture to deal with the impacts of climate 
change. Government efforts are often focused on the 
vulnerable mostly after a crisis has taken place. There 
are calls for forward planning where investments can 
be put in place for preparation, knowing that a drought 
may occur instead of waiting for short term reactionary 
adaptation measures.
The fragmented donor-based call for proposals and 
projects discourages the development of a centralised 
kit or fund for climate change from which institutions 
could borrow. This makes donor funds allocation 
among climate change players highly fragmented and 
uncoordinated. Many stakeholders were of the view that 
for marked up impact all climate change funding should 
be consolidated.
5 Implications for future 
development
 
The above mapping of actors raises several issues with 
implications for future pathways on climate change and 
agriculture. 
5.1 Overall direction – undefined 
climate change and agriculture 
‘landscape’
A key question is what current interventions look 
like and whose interests they serve? We argue that the 
current intervention on-the-ground seem to have a 
common thread: they tend to focus on technical fixes, 
techniques and modernisations, driven by the strength 
of the narrative that technology is the key to Kenya’s 
agricultural problems. As noted above, this resonates 
with a global narrative around agricultural modernisation 
which in many ways has been accommodated, rather 
than challenged by current framings of the climate 
change-agriculture relationship (cf Silva Villanueva and 
Hiraldo, 2013). 
Despite the existence of the NCCRS and more recently 
the NCCAP, much of the climate change and agriculture 
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‘landscape’ remains largely undefined. There are differing 
levels of technical backing to the adaptation initiatives 
under implementation. In respect of responses to 
climate change at the local level, the lack of a coherent 
climate change policy effort leaves significant spaces for 
powerful actors to shape the agenda and activities. The 
land acquisition dynamics in and around the Tana Delta, 
in addition to a modernisation focus which favours formal 
supply networks and the actors associated with them, 
both stand as testament to the potential for climate policy 
in the agricultural context to be shaped by such actors, 
with potentially adverse implications for less powerful 
actors at the local level such as resource poor farmers 
and pastoralists.
5.2 Lack of capacity leading to 
spaces for external actors?
In government systems, efforts are geared towards 
ensuring that climate change issues are factored into 
national socio-economic planning and the necessary 
resources are availed in national annual budgets to 
support these activities. This being a relatively new area of 
activity, staff members require new skills and capabilities 
to plan for climate change effectively. This also includes 
development of mechanisms to monitor and coordinate 
and enforce compliance of environmental regulations 
and guidelines. That said, one informant in the National 
Environment Management Authority (NEMA) stated that 
they were “actively involved though the agriculture office 
in NEMA on climate change issues, on policy engagement 
and enforcing compliance to various laws touching on 
agriculture. Overall, a number of informants recognised 
the need for more capacity building in the following 
areas: 
• Water institutions
• Increasing market access of livestock and 
livestock produce to counter losses due to 
drought
• Institutional efficiency and effectiveness in 
service delivery
• Effective stakeholder engagement with 
processes geared at improving agricultural 
practices. 
Questions have been raised around organisations’ 
understanding of climate change, and in turn the 
resulting strategies. In the view of one interviewee in 
the Ministry of Development of Northern Kenya and 
Other Arid Lands, “Efforts on the ground on climate 
change seem to be ad-hoc and opportunistic – many 
are not aware exactly what climate change is, the impacts, 
linkages etc.” There are also concerns (which in fairness are 
hardly exclusive to Kenya), that the integrity of decision 
makers may not always promote the public good. In the 
words of one informant, 
“I am not sure actually whether we have good 
policies. I suspect that we have bad policy 
implementers, personal interest takes precedence 
over national interests and that happens in almost 
every Ministry. So we can have policies designed 
to propagate that kind of situation”.  
As a consequence, the risk is that funding goes to 
supporting actors close to the policy makers rather than 
the most vulnerable.
5.3 Redefining actors and activities
With donor funding driving local priorities, and with 
the potential for existing ODA funds to be relabelled 
as climate funds (rather than as additional sources of 
finance), an understandable and indeed necessary 
response is for some actors to position themselves as 
worthy recipients. In the words of the respondent from 
the another Ministry,  
“Many government sectors and also the civil society 
have converted themselves into champions of CC 
issues without any technical information about CC. 
This is because it seems to be the buzzword at 
this moment and at the same time many donors 
seem to be interested in the same. The danger of 
this is that we may end up not addressing the real 
issues on CC&A.” 
All the actors are involved in one way or other in 
sensitisation, awareness creation and capacity building at 
various levels including the practitioners, policy makers, 
the scientists and even the farmers. Thus, references to 
capacity building, awareness raising etc, are not just 
about capacity in the abstract, but about what kind of 
capacity should be built, which relates to furthering 
existing agendas, interests and activities.
As the policy process progresses some actors – 
especially civil society – see their purpose as one of 
providing capacity building for policy making and 
implementation, and serving as points of contact for 
exchange of views on public policy issues affecting 
Kenya. The private sector actors such as KEPSA and 
KAM are active in the policy formulation, enactment 
and administration in order to improve the business 
environment, reduce the cost of doing business, and 
ensure that they remain competitive. Others such as 
CAMCO provides clients with project development 
expertise, technical delivery capabilities; policy advice as 
well as regulatory, technical and financial advice on clean 
energy project development and investment; carbon 
project development; energy and carbon advisory; 
energy efficiency software; carbon, energy and emissions 
reduction projects; REDD and Land Use projects. 
NGOs advocate and campaign for a policy and 
legislative framework that puts into account the effects 
of climate change on human development. They 
also support reduced climate change vulnerability of 
poor communities in Kenya through awareness and 
strengthening the capacity of Kenyan local communities 
and civil society to implement community based 
adaptation projects. They promote and advocate 
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for climate-friendly and equity-based development. 
Through wide consultations and collective action, the 
umbrella civil organisations like KCCWG and PACJA 
amplify the voices of the grassroots people and those 
of vulnerable households in the climate change debate. 
However, since they operate with funding from external 
sources, it is not always clear whether what they propose 
reflects the interests of the poor people they advocate on 
behalf of need or the priorities of the funding agencies. 
6 Conclusions
The starting point for this paper was the concern 
over appropriate policy responses to challenges (and 
opportunities) presented by climate change. The 
assumption is that to get policy responses right, there 
is a need to move beyond the idea of policy as a linear, 
technical process in which experts provide advice, 
techniques and technology to inform policy decisions, 
which are then translated into action.
First, dominant narratives focus on technical “fixes” 
and management-oriented solutions to climate change 
in the agricultural sector. The example here is the focus 
on maize and its distribution through a formal network. 
This limits the space for crop diversification, despite 
some signs of increasing government engagement with 
“orphan crops”. ‘Technical fix’-style interventions are often 
posited without tackling the underlying reasons which 
explain why farmers in Kenya are vulnerable in the first 
place. Interventions dealing with vulnerability yield 
positive results in an environment of positive political 
leadership, supportive and coherent government policies 
and strategies, land tenure arrangements that make 
investments worthwhile and, more importantly, access 
to markets and inputs. These are not new opportunities. 
On the contrary, they have been at the heart of debates 
on agricultural development for many decades, and it 
is clear that there are no quick fixes in their absence. 
Moreover, there could be a disconnect between the 
technical fixes proposed and what is happening at 
ground level. Local contexts are often quite dynamic: 
the static and linear character of some technical fixes may 
not necessarily fit with these. Thus, “technical fixes” will 
continue to face confounding factors unless the farmer’s 
voices and narratives especially the silent narratives on 
the ground, are unlocked, listened to and considered.
Second, new actors have taken on board the climate 
change issues or reinvigorated their advocacy around 
this issue. Examples include the Kenya Climate Justice 
women champions developed in July, 2010 that seek to 
drum up grass root support to climate change issues. 
Government institutions such as KARI have set up climate 
change units and subsequently attracted funds, while 
ministries have climate change desk officers. Within a 
seemingly “chaotic” picture (and within a short period) 
and emerging international funds, many actors cluster 
around key narratives. Many genuinely pursue the climate 
change agenda, though within this some are perceived to 
have “recast” themselves as climate change champions. 
There is a strong perception that there is a tendency on 
the part of donors to re-label funds given for agricultural 
development as climate change funding. Whilst this 
allows them to appear to comply with commitments 
made during the international climate negotiations, it 
obscures the lack of additionality in the funding. It also 
means that some activities that are implemented in the 
name of climate change adaptation were not necessarily 
designed from scratch to address adaptation objectives 
(even if they can make contributions to enhancing 
adaptive capacity). 
Third, there is significant space for actors with vested 
interests in the prevailing agricultural status	quo to present 
existing activities as ‘climate solutions’, even when these 
may have adverse impacts on the resilience and adaptive 
capacity of poor farmers. We can see the potential for this 
in the land acquisition dynamics occurring in and around 
the Tana Delta, and the adverse implications they can 
have for pastoralists. Many of these involve the use of new 
technology for the purposes of modernisation, efficiency 
and greater environmental sustainability. This amounts to 
a narrative of long standing within the agricultural arena, 
which has been substantially critiqued in the political 
economy literature on agricultural development. 
From the foregoing, climate change and agriculture 
efforts in Kenya will remain varied and widely spread 
over many actors, regions and priority areas, at least 
in the foreseeable future. The ongoing efforts address 
both adaptation and mitigation scenarios. This could be 
because the agriculture sector strands many economic 
activities all impacted upon by climate change in different 
ways. This makes the agricultural sector in Kenya complex 
with many varied agro-ecological zones, many players 
and actors with differing interests, roles, responsibilities 
and spheres of influence. The underlying challenges 
include high poverty levels, low capacities to adapt and 
dynamic cultural practices add to the complexity. The fact 
that the country lacks localised data and (possibly) the 
critical technical manpower to implement projects that 
deal effectively with the impacts of climate change and 
to plan over varied regions compounds the whole sector. 
A cohesive policy for climate change and agriculture, that 
which is capable of embracing this inherent complexity 
and uncertainty should be adopted. This calls for adaptive 
policies, that are designed to function under complex, 
dynamic and uncertain conditions to navigate towards 
successful outcomes in settings that cannot be anticipated 
in advance (Venema and Drexhage, 2009; Barg and Tyler, 
2009). The policy should create and promote effective 
spaces for and continuous deliberations, adjustment to 
plausible and identified future circumstances and enable 
self-organisation and social networking in support of 
best practices. 
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Annexes
Annex 1: List of key informants and interviewees, July-October 2011
Office of the Prime Minister
Office of the Prime Minister
Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands
Kenya Meteorology Department
National Environmental Management Authority




Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers (KENFAP)
Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA)
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)
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Annex 2: List of key actors and networks
Government Ministries
Institution & Affiliate 
institutions/Committees/
Programmes
Main activities – related to climate change and agriculture
Office of the Prime Minister
• Climate Change 
Coordination Unit,
• Inter-ministerial Consultative 
Forum on Climate Change
• Taskforce for accelerated 
development of green 
energy
• Development and rapid expansion of the national generation of green 
energy
• Approval of follow up activities to implement UNFCCC outcomes
• Facilitation of the implementation of the National Climate Change 
Action Plan
• Assistance in resource mobilisation for implementation of the Action 
Plan
• Certifying that the relevant Ministries mainstream climate change issues 
in their planning and budgeting processes 
• Ensuring that climate change issues are factored into national socio-
economic planning and the necessary resources are availed in national 
annual Budgets to support these activities
• Works closely with the Ministry of Planning, other government 
departments and the private sector on carbon financing and trading 
under CDM or voluntarily markets
Ministry of Environment and 
Mineral Resources (MEMR)
• National Environment 
Management Authority 
(NEMA)
• Kenya Meteorological 
Department (KMD)
• Mines and Geology 
Department
• Department of Resource 
Surveys and Remote Sensing 
(DRSRS)
• Environmental and Natural Resources policy formulation, analysis and 
review
• Sustainable management of mineral resources and conservation of the 
environment.
• Development of geo-database for integrated natural resources and 
environmental management systems
• Conducting applied research and dissemination of research findings in 
land resources and geology
• Promotion, monitoring and coordination of environmental activities 
and enforcing compliance of environmental regulations and guidelines. 
• Developed the NCCRS
• The Climate Change Secretariat at the Ministry is propelling the climate 
change agenda in the country.
• Through NEMA; coordinate statutory environmental committees under 
the Environment management and Coordination Act (EMCA) of 1999, 
which are multi-stakeholder groupings responsible for policy making 
and implementation up to the local level
• Through KMD: Provides meteorological and climatological services to 
agriculture, forestry, water resources management, civil aviation and the 
private sector including industry, commerce and public utilities
Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation
• Kenya Water and Sanitation 
Programme (KWSP) 
• Water Resources 
Management Authority 
(WRMA)
• Management of water resources
• Provision of water services
• Provision of irrigation, drainage, and water storage services
• Land reclamation services
• Capacity building for the water institutions
• Water harvesting and storage technologies to expand the potential for 
increased agricultural production and livestock development
• Irrigation and land reclamation for increased agricultural production, 
particularly in arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs)
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Ministry of Agriculture • Soil and water management
• Water harvesting using small and medium size dams
• Conservation agriculture
• Agro-forestry
• Promotion of drought tolerant crops 
Ministry of Livestock 
Development
• The National Agriculture and 
Livestock Extension 
Programme (NALEP)




• The ASAL Based Livestock 
and Rural Livelihoods 
Support Project
• Smallholder Dairy 
Commercialization 
Programme (SDCP)
• The Kenya Agricultural 
Productivity Project (KAPP)
• Somali Ecosystem Rinderpest 
Control Unit (SERECU)
• Develop appropriate policy and legal environment
• Increase livestock productivity through provision of widely accessible 
inputs and services to farmers and pastoralists
• Enhance investment in the livestock sector
• Increase market access of livestock and livestock produce
• Enhance institutional efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery
Ministry of Development of 
Northern Kenya and other 
Arid areas
• Arid land Resources 
Management Project
• Increasing resilience to drought and floods
• Improved water management to prepare for abundance and scarcity
• Development of regimes to increase equitable access to areas of crop 
and forage production
• Investment on infrastructure that can resist the frequent extreme 
weather events
• Provision of drought induced off-take
• Institutionalisation of early warning systems and early response 
mechanisms
• Establishment of a National Drought Management Authority
• Exploring opportunities and develop mechanisms through which 
communities can benefit from bio-carbon initiatives
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Ministry of Energy
• Kenya Power and Lighting 
Company Limited (KPLC)
• Kenya Petroleum Refineries 
Limited (KPRL)
• Kenya Electricity Generating 
Company Limited (KenGen)
• National Oil Corporation of 
Kenya (National Oil)
• Kenya Pipeline Company 
Limited (KPC)
• Energy Regulatory 
Commission (ERC)
• Rural Electrification Authority 
(REA)
• Energy Tribunal
• Geothermal Development 
Company (GDC)
• Kenya Electricity Transmitting 
Company (KETRACO)
• Energy policy development
• Hydropower development
• Geothermal exploration and development
• Thermal power development
• Petroleum products – import/export/marketing policy
• Renewable energy development
• Energy regulation, security and conservation
• Fossil fuels exploration and development
• Rural electrification Programme.
Agricultural Sector 
Coordination Unit
• Drive reforms in the sector and fast-track implementation of the ASDS in 
a coordinated manner across sector ministries and other partners
• Referral centre for reforms, and collect, analyse and disseminate 
information on agricultural reforms
• Influence sector resource allocation to areas of highest impact
• Initiate major studies and policy developments within the agricultural 
sector
• Centre for capacity building for all stakeholders involved or affected by 
the agricultural reform process
• Monitor implementation of ASDS activities
Ministry for Planning, 
National Development and 
Vision 2030
• Coordination of government economic policies, including regional and 
international cooperation policies. It is also mandated with the 
coordination and preparation of the planning components of the 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF); the Fiscal Strategy Paper 
and the requisite budget documents. 
• Preparation of the main National Development Plan documents, 
including the District Development Plans; National Development Plans, 
and specific socio-economic programmes and plans. 
• Coordination and management of population, economic and national 
statistical services within government; 
• Provides leadership in the national Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 
framework. 
• Facilitate and coordinate the national development planning process 
and provide leadership in national economic policy management.
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Research and Policy Institutions
Kenya Agriculture Research 
Institute (KARI)
• Strengthening biotechnological research in crop and livestock varieties 
that are resistant or tolerant to pests and diseases, drought, and have 
improved nutritional value
• Undertaking countrywide assessments to determine regional 
vulnerability of the agricultural sector to climate change elements
• Strengthening research in vaccines against priority livestock diseases 
• Strengthening research on good agricultural practices
• Integrating a long-term climate-risk perspective into planning and 
investments
Kenya Institute for Public 
Policy Research and Analysis 
(KIPPRA)
• Research and policy analysis in all sectors of the Kenyan economy, 
• Provides capacity building for policy making and implementation, and 
serves as a point of contact for exchange of views on public policy issues 
affecting Kenya.
• Establishment of a database of stakeholders in policy research and 
advocacy to build climate change resilience that equips communities 
with the ability to plan for, survive, recover from, and even thrive in 
changing climatic conditions.
Private Sector Organisations
Kenya Private Sector Alliance 
(KEPSA)
• Provides a unified voice for sector to engage and influence policy 
formulation, monitor government’s implementation of development 
plans, and promotion of dialogue among sector members on matters of 
their interests.
Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers (KAM)
• Provides an essential link for co-operation, dialogue and understanding 
with the Government by promoting trade and investment, upholding 
standards and representing members’ views and concerns to the 
relevant authorities.
• Encourages the formulation, enactment and administration of sound 
policies in order to improve the business environment, reduce the cost 
of doing business, and ensure that Kenyan firms attain and maintain 
world-class competitiveness.
CAMCO • Developer of greenhouse gas emission reductions and clean energy 
projects
• Provides clients with project development expertise, technical delivery 
capabilities; policy advice as well as regulatory, technical and financial 
advice on clean energy project development and investment; carbon 
project development; energy and carbon advisory; energy efficiency 
software; carbon, energy and emissions reduction projects; REDD and 
Land Use projects
• Lead agency in developing the National Climate Change Response 
Strategy for Kenya. 
• Supports the development of renewable energy projects in various 
sectors including biomass for electricity (e.g., wood, sugar bagasse, 
other crop wastes, etc.), solar photovoltaics (PV, both grid-connected 
and non-grid-connected), small hydropower and wind
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Non-governmental Organisations
Kenya Climate Change 
Working Group
• Forum that brings together Civil Society Organisations, donor partners, 
government departments and agencies working in climate change and 
climate justice
• Advocate and campaign for a positive policy and legislative framework 
that puts into account the effects of climate change on human 
development
• Support and coordinate civil society organisations, and the government 
to participate meaningfully in the climate change debates at the local, 
national, regional and international level, including at Subsidiary bodies 
and Conference of Parties (COP)
• Supports reduced climate change vulnerability of poor communities in 
Kenya through awareness and strengthening the capacity of Kenyan 
local communities and civil society to implement community based 
adaptation projects.
Pan African Climate Justice 
Alliance (PACJA)
• Promotes and advocates for climate-friendly and equity-based 
development
• Unifies civil society efforts on climate change advocacy and 
coordination in Africa
• Encourages strategic alliances with international partners, national 
governments, regional governmental bodies as well as individuals to 
ensure that the African voice is amplified in international climate change 
dialogue processes
• Works with like-minded partners from the North and the South, so as to 
ensure that the resultant framework on climate change agreed by the 
community of nations is not only equitable, but also a product of 
massive consultation, responsive to the realities of vulnerable 
communities.
• Works closely with key stakeholders such as African Ministerial 
Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), UNEP Regional Office for 
Africa, regional economic integration bodies and national governments 
to enhance the continent’s voice in international dialogue process, as 
well as driving climate-related policies in African governments
CARE Kenya • Increasing the capacity of vulnerable households in Sub-Saharan Africa 
to adapt to climate variability and change and to incorporate 
Community Based adaptation (CBA) approaches for vulnerable 
communities in development policies and programs
• Making carbon markets work for the poor by developing carbon finance 
for agricultural projects through identification of appropriate carbon 
accounting methodology and on-farm tree planting
• Sustainable Agriculture in a changing Climate is a project that provides 
information, seedlings, and training to households to introduce agro-
forestry and woodlot management practices with a view to increasing 
availability of energy, food and enhancing incomes and reducing carbon 
emissions
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International Development agencies
DFID • One of the largest donors in Kenya and a core partner in the Kenya Joint 
Assistance Strategy (2007-2012)
• Climate change efforts in building resilience and supporting low carbon 
growth to reduce losses from extreme climate events
French Development Agency • Chairs the Climate Change Donor Coordination Group where climate 
change activities and funding mechanisms are discussed
• Works so closely with the Ministry of Energy and its counterparts to 
support the government’s efforts in the energy sector
• Involved in the rural electrification program
• Investments in the geothermal energy sector in support of a low carbon 
development pathway as a mitigation action
Rockefeller Foundation • Testing interventions that could be implemented more extensively to build 
resilience to climate change
• Developing the necessary scientific evidence base and policy environment 
to promote agricultural resilience
• Building the required capacity that will enable a core of agricultural scientists 
and development experts to execute best practices in climate change 
resilience measures.
UNDP • Building Kenya’s capacity to address climate change by providing a set of 
integrated support services geared towards helping the country assess 
climate change impact and realistic response strategies and to develop 
and implement relevant policies and regulations
• Mainstreaming climate change into core government development areas, 
including energy, agriculture, health, waters resources and infrastructure, 
emphasising that climate change is not only an environmental issue, but 
a core developmental concern
• Helping diversify funding sources Kenya can access to facilitate effective 
financing of sound solutions
• Building the country ability to access foreign direct investment and 
appropriate technologies through environmental finance opportunities 
such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
IDRC • Provides significant support for research activities led by universities, 
research institutes, government departments and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in Kenya
Kenya National Federation of 
Agricultural Producers 
(KENFAP)
• Kenya National Domestic 
Biogas Programme 
(KENDBIP)
• Promotes unity, co-operation and dialogue among its members and 
between its members and other actors in the agricultural sector
• Ensures timely intervention in the resolution of issues affecting the 
agricultural sector
• Ensures effective representation of the farming community and expression 
of its views to government and the public at large
• Encourages effective networking and collaboration with national and 
international associations which share the Federation’s objectives and 
aspirations
• Conducts and documents research into problems affecting agricultural 
production, marketing, value addition and policy
• Encourages collaboration between members of the farming community 
and any other legitimate entity whose actions are in the interest of the 
farming community
• Though KENBRID – supports investments in renewable energy





Coverage (crops, region, farming system)
National Food and Nutritional Security 
Policy
1994 Food security
Pyrethrum Industry Sessional Paper 1999 Pyrethrum, liberalisation of the industry
Liberalisation and restructuring of the 
Tea industry, Sessional paper No. 2 of 
1999
1999 Tea
Oil Seed Crops Development Policy 2001 Oil crops
National Seed Industry Policy 2004 Avail high quality seed and planting materials
Amendment of the Coffee Act No. 9 of 
2001
2005 Coffee
National Agriculture Sector Extension 
Policy
2005 Extension services on crops and livestock
Pest Control Products Board (PCPB) 
Amendment Bill, 2005
2005 Pesticides and Herbicides
National Horticulture Development 
Policy
2005 Horticulture
National Forest Policy, Sessional paper 
No. 9, 2005
2005 Sustainable land use through soil, water and 
biodiversity conservation and tree planting
Cotton Amendment act, 2006 2006 Reviving the cotton sector
Sessional paper on soil fertility  and a 
bill on Fertilisers and soil conditioners, 
2006
2006 Soil fertility, Fertilisers
National Potato Industry policy 2006 Potato
Cassava Policy 2006 Cassava
Dairy Development Policy 2006 Dairy value chain
National Biotechnology and 
Development Policy
2006 Biotechnology (seed, crops, animal)
Amendments to the NCPB Act Cap 338 2007 Strategic reserve for cereal for food security
Development of a concept paper on 
modalities for Harmonisation of the 
Kenya Agricultural Sector Legislation
2007 130 legislation relating to agriculture to be 
consolidated into 7 legislations covering all aspects in 
crops and livestock
Nut Crops Development Policy and Bill 2007 Macadamia
KEPHIS Bill 2007 Inspectorate services on all matters related to plant 
health and quality control of agricultural inputs and 
produce
The Agricultural Produce (Export) 
Rules, 2007 (Cap 319)
2007 Crops grown for export, horticulture and industrial 
crops.
National Land Policy 2007 Secure rights over land and provide for sustainable 
growth and investment.
National Land Use Act 2007 Establishment of guidelines and control on use of land 
resources
Regional Development Policy 2007 Achieve equitable and balanced National Economic 
Development
Co-operative Development National 
Policy
2007 Revitalise, realign and liberalise the co-operative 
movement
Investment Policy 2007 Encourage prudent investment in co-operatives
Annex 3: Summary of policies in the Agricultural Sector Ministries in 
Kenya (1994-2008)
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Ethics and Governance Bill 2007 Strengthening the leadership management and 
governance in co-operatives
SACCO Bill 2007 Strengthen SACCO operations
Sessional Paper Seed Industry/Draft 
Seeds and Plant Varieties Bill, 2008
2008 Harmonised seed and related planting materials 
legislations
Sessional paper and amendment of 
Sugar Act No.10 of 2001
2008 Sugar sub-sector restructuring the sector to make it more 
efficient and competitive
Regional Development Act 2008 Harmonise operations of the six Regional Development 
Authorities
National Water Storage Policy 2008 Aims at increasing water storage from 5.3m3  to 1000m3 
per capita by 2030
National Irrigation and Drainage Policy 2008 To accelerate sustainable development of irrigation and 
drainage
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Annex 4: Acronyms and abbreviations
AAP Africa Adaptation Program
AFD French Agency for Development
ASALs Arid and semi-arid lands 
ASCU Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit
ASM Agricultural Sector Ministries 
CA Conservation Agriculture 
CARE Christian Action Research and Education
CC&A Climate Change and Agriculture
CCU Climate Coordination Unit 
CDKN Climate and Development Knowledge and Network 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COP Conference of Parties
DACs District Agricultural Committees 
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DFID UK Department for International Development 
EAAPP East Africa Agricultural Productivity Program
ECAF European Conservation Agriculture Federation
FAC Future Agricultures Consortium
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
GFAR Global Forum on Agricultural Research
GHG Green House Gas
GoK Government of Kenya
GTZ German Technical Cooperation
IDRC International Development Research Centre
ILRI International Livestock Research Institute
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KAM Kenya Association of Manufacturers
KARI Kenya Agricultural Research Institute
KCCWG Kenya Climate Change Working Group
KENFAP Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers
KEPHIS Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services
KEPSA Kenya Private Sector Alliance 
KIPPRA Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KNOTS Knowledge, Technology and Society
LDCs Least Developed Countries
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
MEMR Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources
MoA Ministry of Agriculture
MoDNKAL Ministry of Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands
NAEP National Agricultural Extension Policy 
NAMAs Nationally Appropriate Mitigations Actions 
NCCRS National Climate Change Response Strategy 
NCPB National Cereals and Produce Board
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NEMA National Environment Management Authority
NGOs Non Governmental organisations 
NRMP Natural Resource Management Programme
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OPM Office of the Prime Minister
ODA Oversees Development Assistance 
OXFAM Oxford committee for Famine Relief
PACJA Pan African Climate Justice Alliance
SACCO Savings and Credit Cooperative Organisation
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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